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Double Blind Lawmaking and Other
Comments on Formalism in the Tax Law
Saul Levmoret
David Weisbach's Article for this Symposium, Formalism in
the Tax Law,' is intriguing and accomplished. It wastes no time
in putting some meat on the skeleton of debates about formalism.
I do not summarize it here. Readers will know that it emphasizes
the one-way nature of anti-abuse rules; the possibility of a link
between standards and simplicity; the idea that behavior will
change (in tax law and perhaps in other legal fields where there
is behavioral elasticity) in response to a "first mover's" rulemak-
ing strategies; and the importance of thinking about discontinui-
ties in rules because these gaps in tax law might stimulate arbi-
trage, litigation, and the like. In the end, we are convinced that
tax law relies sensibly on anti-abuse rules of a fuzzy sort pre-
cisely because taxpayers are quite able to adapt their behavior
once the government makes nonfuzzy first moves. Weisbach's
clever way of putting this point is to say that in tax law there is
the danger that the uncommon will become common. Slightly un-
derinclusive rules become grotesquely so. Formalism, if we must
put it that way in this Symposium, would encourage waste. In
this Comment I address the one-way character of anti-abuse
rules and then this problem of the uncommon becoming common.
I. ONE-WAY RULES
Weisbach hints that we ought to be suspicious of the one-way
nature of the anti-abuse rules recently made a part of our tax
code. The government insists that it can question the formalities
used by a taxpayer in order to assert that the substance of the
transaction suggests a different tax treatment than that claimed
by the taxpayer. But the government does not normally allow for
the possibility that the taxpayer might choose some formalities
and then ask for a tax treatment that normally applies to differ-
ent formalities, even though the substance of what the taxpayer
did might have allowed the second set of formalities. Thus, if a
corporate taxpayer redeems stock held by shareholders, the gov-
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ermnent might assert that the redemption was "really" a divi-
dend. But if the taxpayer distributes dividends, the taxpayer is
not normally allowed to claim later that "really" this dividend
was a redemption. Similarly, a taxpayer that calls an entity a
partnership cannot later assert that it was a corporation in sub-
stance, although the government might so recharacterize a busi-
ness entity.
There is nothing remarkable about this characteristic of the
anti-abuse rules. This is not a setting where we ought to expect
symmetry in legal rules. Consider, for example, the one-way na-
ture of private rules such as the rule in take-it-or-leave-it airline
"contracts," which informs ticket holders that seats will be for-
feited if passengers do not appear at the gate at least fifteen min-
utes before scheduled departure. Some restaurants and athletic
clubs do the same; reservations are said to be held no more than
fifteen minutes after the assigned times.
These rules are one-way in two ways. First, they are not
symmetrical in the sense that the same fifteen minute rule is not
applied to, or even expected of, the other party to the arrange-
ment. If the passenger arrives in a timely fashion but the aircraft
is late, the airline owes nothing. Indeed, it need not allow the
passenger to back out of the contract. Similarly, the restaurant
that pushes eager patrons to the bar for a long wait need not pay,
though here the customer can withdraw easily, albeit without
collecting reliance or other damages.
This asymmetry is sensible, as every contracts student
learns, because there is no reason to think that the parties to any
of these arrangements value time or inventory in an identical
fashion. A given passenger might value her time more or less
than the airline, such that she might (or might not) be willing to
pay a premium for a reservation that came with the under-
standing that, in the event of delay, the airline would roll up a
spare aircraft or would avoid delay by scheduling flights with un-
usually large margins of safety in terms of turnaround time. At
present, no developed market exists for this sort of travel, but the
point is that it is not clear that passengers would pay for it-and
there is certainly no reason to think that the default rule in con-
tracts should amount to an assumption that passengers value
their time exactly as the airline values its passengers' timely
presence. There may of course be some gain in arguing for such a
rule. A doctor who announces that a missed appointment will cost
the patient one hundred dollars might be amused or fooled into
thinking it only fair or legal to refund that amount to the patient
if the doctor is called elsewhere and does not materialize as
[66:915
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promised. But most contracting parties recognize that unilater-
ally fashioned rules are just that. One-way rules are not normally
suspect, and may not even be surprising.
Similarly, some taxpayers might well be willing to pay a
great deal for an ability to elevate substance over form. They
might be willing to pay for the ability to choose their form of do-
ing business through a kind of "check the box" scheme. They
might even be willing to pay more for the right to do this with the
benefit of hindsight-an end of year election rather than an edu-
cated guess before doing business. But there is no reason to think
that the average taxpayer would value this enough to compensate
for the increased tax rates that all would need to pay for such a
rule. The tax collector, like most airlines and restaurants, would
likely "pay" more than would taxpayers for rules giving it flexi-
bility and the right to insist that formalities are weapons to be
used against taxpayers exclusively-never to be turned upon the
tax collector by the taxpayers. The overwhelming majority of tax-
payers, airline passengers, and restaurant patrons are, in an im-
portant sense, willing to accede to one-way anti-abuse rules.
Second, these anti-abuse rules are also one-way in that they
are options for the rulemaker. An airline can hold passengers to
their reservations if these passengers are late. It is even conceiv-
able that an airline would refuse to seat a passenger even if it
had empty seats or a delayed departure when the passenger was
late, for such a practice might encourage early arrival next time
when it matters. There is every reason to think that the airline is
in the best position to make this judgment. Much in the same
way, the government is not required to deny taxpayers their at-
tempts to "abuse" formalities.
One-way anti-abuse rules are thus notable but not remark-
able. Indeed, the one-way quality of the airline example might be
described as a safe harbor. Setting aside "bumping" rules as they
apply to overbooked flights, the airline's position is essentially
that the passenger is safe if the passenger checks in fifteen min-
utes before the scheduled departure but that the passenger will
often-but not always-do just as well coming a bit after that
time. This is exactly what safe harbor rules do in tax law. The
law might announce that in a corporate combination if old equity
holders of a firm receive more than 50 percent of their considera-
tion in new equity then they qualify for tax-free reorganization
treatment.' It might state that a redemption of shares safely re-
" See Rev Proc 77-37, 1977-2 Cum Bull 568, 569 (taking position that for ruling pur-
poses at least 50 percent of consideration must be stock to qualify under IRC § 368(aX1)
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ceives exchange treatment if the shareholder's ownership per-
centage drops by a certain amount.' In such situations it is possi-
ble to enjoy the same favorable treatment outside of the safe har-
bor.4 But then one must argue or hope to show that the problem
addressed in the Code is not raised by allowing the particular
taxpayer to enjoy exchange treatment, reorganization treatment,
or other such 'Tavors." The government behaves here exactly as
do the airlines, offering a safe harbor but sometimes allowing for
the same treatment outside the shelter of the harbor. By operat-
ing outside of the safe harbor, the taxpayer faces some risk and
perhaps legal costs, but overall the safe harbor approach seems
perfectly sensible.
Similar safe harbors exist in many areas of law. I refer to
them not as proof that they belong in tax law as well, but rather
as suggestive of the idea that, where one area of law resembles
others, and especially where there is similarity to evolved, private
arrangements, it is likely that the common feature is a desirable
one. Having thus far referred to private arrangements, it may be
useful to note a safe harbor in public law. Consider, for example,
statutes of limitations, which normally provide safe harbors for
those who wish for their claims to be regarded as timely. The
limitation period may on the margin affect the pace at which po-
tential litigants gather information as well as their inclination to
abandon some other strategies for resolving disputes. The statu-
tory period also promises a period during which potential liti-
gants need not rush their claims or fear dismissal for tardiness. If
there were no such certain periods for bringing claims-which is
to say if applications of and disputes about laches or seemingly
untimely claims dominated the landscape-then the absence of a
safe harbor would likely encourage earlier unnecessary filings.
II. DOUBLE BLIND RULES
I turn to the dynamic nature of tax law and taxpayer adapta-
tions, and to the claim that the uncommon becomes common.
There is no need to dwell on the question of whether this danger
or feature is unique to tax law. Indeed, my suggestion in this Sec-
(1976)).
See IRC § 302(bX2) (1994) (applying exchange treatment if percentage of voting
stock held by shareholder falls by more than 20 percent and to a point below 50 percent).
' See IRC § 302(b)(1) (providing exchange treatment for redemptions "not essentially
equivalent to a dividend" even though they do not meet the ownership drop formalized in
the safe harbor of section 302(b)(2)). The same might be said of IRC § 368(aX1XA), which
allows for reorganization treatment in transactions that are less well defined ("a statutory
merger or consolidation") than those provided for later in subsections (aX)()B)-(C).
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tion increases in value if the uncommon often (inefficiently or un-
desirably) becomes common in response to rulemaking. If the
problem is that the government as rulemaker suffers from a kind
of first-mover disadvantage, because taxpayers design their
transactions to avoid the known rules, then consider what would
happen if the government denied taxpayers information about
these rules. Of course, if taxpayers fashioned their transactions
and then the government designed its rules, the problem (if it is a
problem) would be reversed. Taxpayers would have the first-
mover disadvantage and there would be the danger that the gov-
ernment would draft inappropriate rules in order to collect more
revenue. From an efficiency perspective, taxpayers might be
overly constrained because of their fears about the likely content
of the second mover's rules. In an important sense, this is the ob-
jection to some retroactive rulemaking. A government that can
pass rules with retroactive application enjoys the position of sec-
ond mover, for better and for worse.'
Imagine now a scheme in which the government wrote the
rules, but withheld complete information about their content.
Thus, the government might announce that there would indeed
be capital gains treatment for assets held somewhere between
three months and five years, but that the precise holding period
would not be revealed until after the end of the tax year. Taxpay-
ers would lose their second mover advantage but so would the
government. This application of double blind rules falls some-
where in between current practice and strong-form retroactivity.
The government must draft these rules without complete knowl-
edge of taxpayers' transactions but in turn taxpayers must act
with incomplete knowledge of the rules they wish to avoid (or
enjoy). Note that the five-year upper bound in the illustration of-
fers a safe harbor; double blind rules can retain the advantages of
safe harbors.6 Weisbach's Article might serve as a useful re-
minder that there is room for some creativity and experimenta-
tion with double blind rules. And if this is not the case, which is
' See Saul Levmore, The Case for Retroactive Taxation, 22 J Legal Stud 265 (1993);
Daniel N. Shaviro, The Law and Economics of Tax and Other Retroactivity (Nov 1998)
(unpublished manuscript on file with U Chi L Rev).
6 Double blind rules are not entirely unknown. Thus, there is the idea, offered some
time ago by Jeffrey O'Connell, that settlements might be promoted by offering parties a
means of avoiding the danger that they reveal weakness by making a settlement offer. Of-
fers can be communicated to a third party who announces when two disputing parties
have generated a range for settlement. Different rules for establishing settlement points
can be agreed to in advance of these blind offers. For some formal exploration of the idea,
see Robert H. Gertner and Geoffrey P. Miller, Settlement Escrows, 24 J Legal Stud 87
(1995) (arguing in favor of double blind settlement resolution).
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to say if it is unlikely that less information is here better than
more, then perhaps the concern with the uncommon becoming
common is misplaced. The dynamics of adaptation may be an-
noying but not terribly inefficient.
There is, moreover, a sense in which our tax law (not to men-
tion other law) has long ago taken steps toward this double blind
rulemaking strategy. We often see a fuzzy statute generating
adaptive behavior by those it regulates and, in turn, by regula-
tors-but then judges intervene and turn the earlier standards
into ex post rules, or at least half-rules in the form of safe har-
bors. These rules may come too late to provide taxpayers with
certainty, but they do offer an advantage in terms of decreasing
reporting and enforcement costs. We might think of this tradition
of midstream judicial rulemaking as reflecting or even encourag-
ing a kind of double blind strategy as between regulators and
those who are regulated.
III. A NoTE ON DISCONTINUITIES
If a motorist who exceeds the speed limit of 55 pays a huge
penalty when nabbed going 56 miles per hour, but one who drives
55 pays nothing, then in the face of uncertainty motorists may
drive not 55 but 45 miles per hour. In this example a discontinu-
ous liability rule appears to lead to excessive precautions. But in
other cases there will be less uncertainty as to the accuracy of the
factfinder or one's own speedometer, or perhaps the liability rule
will be discontinuous but damages will be calculated incremen-
tally. If the speedster pays in damages only the extra costs asso-
ciated with driving 56 rather than 55, then there is no serious
discontinuity to avoid. Weisbach properly leads the reader to the
counterintuitive idea that "cliffs," or discontinuities, do not neces-
sarily lead to more precautions.'
Still, since discontinuities may lead to "excessive" avoidance
strategies, Weisbach is surely correct to point out that rules are
generally more discontinuous than standards.8 We should note
that this comparison may be the source of safe harbors' value-
safe harbors minimize the problem of discontinuities. There is
also the interesting claim that discontinuities generate arbitrage
or inefficient offsetting positions. Here I would simply add the ob-
servation that ex post rules (where the government is the second
mover or perhaps the double blind mover whose rules are un-
known until afterward) might not generate arbitrage. In any
Weisbach, 66 U Chi L Rev at 873 (cited in note 1).
Id at 874.
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event, it is surely the case that double blind rules would generate
less arbitrage than would rules put forth by a first mover.
Here, as in so many other areas of tax law, there is much to
be gained by drawing comparisons to other areas of law. I have
suggested that one-way rules look better when we see their
prevalence elsewhere. Double blind rules may be useful in a vari-
ety of settings, although I do not pretend to have shown that they
are well accepted elsewhere. Finally, the problem (or lack thereof)
of discontinuities is found in many settings, but here tax com-
mentators have avoided the mistake of thinking that tax law is
an island with little to learn from or to offer other areas.
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